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CASE NOTES
Civil Rights-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED ON MARITAL STA-
TUS-Cjbyske v. Independent School District No. 196, 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn.
1984).
Employment discrimination due to sex or any other invidious classficaton is pecu-
harly repugnant in a society which prides itself on judging each individual by his
or her merits. I
The harsh ramifications of employment discrimination based on mari-
tal status fall disproportionately on women,2 and perpetuate wage dis-
parity between the sexes. 3 Federal equal employment opportunity
1. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 77 N.J. 55, 80, 389 A.2d 465, 478 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Korvasky & Hauck, The No-Spouse Rule, Tide VII, and Arbitration, 32 LAB.
LJ. 366, 369 (1981) (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has challenged the no-
spouse rule because it excludes more women than men from employment); Wexler, Hus-
bands and Wives: The Uneasy Casefor Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U.L. REV. 75, 79 (1982) ("be-
cause women generally enter the labor market on a permanent basis later than men," an
employment policy based on marital status "necessarily favors men over women").
A common misperception of the relationship between marital status and job separa-
tion rates perpetuates job discrimination to the disproportionate detriment of women. See
Green, Haber & Lamas, A New Method For Estimating Job Separations By Sex and Race, 106
MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1983, at 20 & n.2. "The traditionally weaker labor force
attachment among women in comparison with men. . . has given rise to the perception
that the risk of loss of a firm's investment in specific [job-related] training is greater for"
women than for men. Id This perception constitutes one basis for discrimination in
which classification information pertaining to sex, race, or marital status is used as a stan-
dard for hiring men rather than women, although both may be equally qualified for a
given job. Id
Management attitudes also give rise to stereotypes based on marital status that result
in job discrimination against women. See generall, Blumrosen, Wage Discnmination, Job Seg-
regation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 42C (1979)
("employer attitudes include beliefs that a woman's primary commitment is to her family,
which limits her effectiveness on the job"). Blumrosen states:
The belief that woman's real life work is her home and family, and that man is
the chief breadwinner, also leads to the belief that a woman is the secondary
source of family income. It then follows that since she is only working for "pin
money" she doesn't need to be paid much, and that since hers is the secondary
income, women workers should be fired before male workers in case of an eco-
nomic recession.
Id at 421 (emphasis in original).
3. See, e.g., Mellor & Stamas, Usal Weekly Earnings." Another Look at Intergroup Dif'r-
ences and Basic Trends, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 1982, at 16 (for women working full
time, the median weekly earnings in 1981 were 65% of those of men). One explanation for
these differences is that occupational sex segregation plays a critical role. See Rytina, Occu-
pational Segregation and Earnings Differences by Sex, 104 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Jan. 1981, at 49
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guidelines do not specifically preclude job discrimination based on mari-
tal status. 4 In an effort to correct this omission, many states have
adopted statutes prohibiting marital status-based discrimination. 5 Once
& n.2 (occupational sex segregation has a negative impact on female earnings, thus con-
tributing to the persistence of male and female earnings differentials). See generally Belier,
The Effects of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1961 on Women's Entiy into Nontraditional
Occupations: An Economic Analysis, 1 L. & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRAC. 73, 77 (1983)
(economists theorize that discrimination against women in the labor market causes occu-
pational segregation which explains most of the earnings gap between men and women).
4. See McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 26 Wash. App. 195, 202, 613 P.2d 146, 152
(1980) (marital status is not an independent basis insofar as what is required is "sex-plus"
discrimination); see also Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892, 894 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "does not purport to ban all discrimination, but
only the specific forms enumerated by the statute"); Bradington v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 845, 852 (D. Md. 1973) (distinctions based on marital status
are not specifically alluded to in the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Richardson v. Hotel Corp.
of Am., 332 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D. La. 1971) ("No federal statute prohibits discrimina-
tion per se; rather, what is prohibited is discrimination that is racially motivated [or based
on color, religion, sex or national origin]").
Federal court decisions, however, indicate that an employer's use of distinctions based
on marital status may constitute sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. See A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 11.22 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp.
1984). See generally Kandel, Marital Status andJob Discrimination, 8 EMPL. REL. L.J. 120, 120
(1982) ("Federal guidelines on sex discrimination generally forbid considerations of mari-
tal status because of the likelihood that employment of married women would be re-
stricted for no job-related reason"); Annot., 34 A.L.R. FED. 648 (1977) (analysis of federal
court cases and decisions of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dealing
with whether an employer's use of distinctions based on marital status constitutes sex dis-
crimination under § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1982)). These decisions involve "sex-plus" classification, a situation where an em-
ployer classifies employees on the basis of sex "plus" another characteristic. See generally B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 403-12 (1983).
The term "sex-plus" originated in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542
(1971). In Philh'/s, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's policy of refusing to hire
women with preschool age children while employing men regardless of their parental sta-
tus constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id at 544. The Court noted
that the defendant did not discriminate against women per se, but did discriminate
against a subclass of women, those who had preschool children. Id. at 543. The "sex-plus
marital status" theory was later analyzed in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d
1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). In Sprogis, the court held the appli-
cation of a no-marriage rule exclusively to female cabin attendants to be in violation of
Title VII's sex discrimination provisions. Id. at 1198. The court found sex discrimination
in United's failure to place similar restrictions on the employment opportunities of mar-
ried males. Id. The court noted that the scope of§ 703(a) of Title VII was not confined to
explicit discrimination based "solely" on sex. Id. For an informative presentation on em-
ployment discrimination law and practice techniques for the Minnesota practitioner, see
the Seminar Materials of Forums, Professional Education Series, Employment Dscrtminat'ot"
A Basic Course for Minnesota Practitioners (Nov. 12, 1982) (available in William Mitchell Col-
lege of Law Library).
5. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia forbid employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of marital status. 8A Fair Employment Practices Manual, LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 451:102-04 (1984) (state law chart). For an example of such a statute, see New
York's Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296(l)(a) (McKinney 1982), which de-
[Vol. I1I
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the term "marital status" is defined, the factual determination of marital
status discrimination may be straightforward.6 State courts remain di-
vided,7 however, as to whether marital status refers only to whether one
is married or if it includes the identity or situation of one's spouse.8
The Minnesota Supreme Court has refused to categorically extend its
marital status discrimination interpretation to include the identity or sit-
uation of the spouse. In Cybyske v. Independent School District No. 196,9 the
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the identity and situation of the
dares that it is an unlawful, discriminatory practice "for an employer or licensing agency,
because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex or disability, or marital status to
refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to
discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges
of employment." See also ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(1) (1982); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940
(West Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a)(1) (1981) (marital status is defined as the
state of being married, single, divorced, separated, or widowed, and the usual conditions
associated therewith, including pregnancy or parenthood); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10(1)
(West Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-2(1) (Supp. 1981) (marital status means the
state of being married or single); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103(J) (Smith-Hurd 1984-
1985) (marital status means the legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced,
or widowed); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 55 IA-553 (Supp. 1983-1984) (prohibits mari-
tal status discrimination in state employment only); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)(l)
(1979); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2202(a) (1984-1985); MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1
(Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (1984)
(marital status shall mean the status of a person whether married or single); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-1 (West 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-02.4-.03 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.030 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.180 (1984-1985) (discrimination against an employee or applicant for employment
because of (a) what a person's marital status is; (b) who his or her spouse is; or (c) what the
spouse does, is an unfair practice because the action is based on the person's marital sta-
tus); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.322 (West 1983-1984) (marital status means the status of
being married, single, divorced, separated, or widowed).
Some state human rights commissions have the authority to interpret statutory lan-
guage and have adopted regulations prohibiting discrimination related to marital status.
See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2, § 7292.1 (marital status is defined as an individuals'
state of marriage, non-marriage, divorce or dissolution, separation, widowhood, annul-
ment, or other marital state); IOWA ADMIN. CODE ch. 240, § 3.6 (any distinction between
married and unmarried persons of one sex that is not made between married and unmar-
ried persons of the opposite sex is considered discrimination on the basis of sex); KAN.
ADMIN. REGs. § 21-32-4 (prohibition of employment discrimination is based on sex plus
marital status).
6. See Wexler, supra note 2, at 126 (under a statute that prohibits discrimination on
the basis of marital status, the plaintiff must prove only that employment was denied
because of his or her marital status).
7. See in/ra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights
Comm'n, 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1978) (legal question before the court was
whether the legislature intended to confine the state's human rights commission, in its
search for discriminatory practices, to instances where an individual is discriminated
against solely because he is divorced, widowed, single, or married, without reference to the
identity, occupation, affluence, or other attribute of the spouse).
9. 347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1984).
1985]
3
et al.: Civil Rights—Employment Discrimination Based on Marital Status—Cy
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
spouse is an important factor in determining whether marital status dis-
crimination exists. 0 Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiff, who
was not hired for a teaching position because of the pro-teacher views of
her husband, did not have a claim for marital status discrimination t
10. Id. at 261.
11. The court considered several issues in addition to the issue of marital status dis-
crimination. First, Lynne Cybyske alleged a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. V 1981) for infringement of her right to freedom of association. Id at 259. Section
1983 was adopted by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13.
Broadly described, the intent of section 1983 was to create a civil remedy for persons who
prove that one acting under color of state law has illegally deprived them of rights guaran-
teed by the federal constitution or by federal law. Owen v. City of Independent, 445 U.S.
622, 635 (1980). The two principal policies underlying an action under this section are
compensation and deterrence. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 583, 591 (1978). For an
informative discussion of the evolution of section 1983, see Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctri-
nal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 482 (1982).
In Cybyske, the court applied the general principle that an action under color of state
law may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes upon his constitutionally
protected interests. See 347 N.W.2d at 262; see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597
(1972). Specifically, where a public employer discriminates against a job applicant be-
cause the employer dislikes the activities of the applicant's spouse, particularly where the
spouse is only exercising his or her first amendment rights in performance of public service
as a school board member, the job applicant's associational freedoms have been impaired.
347 N.W.2d at 262; cf. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 13 (1966).
The Cybyske court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
plaintiff's section 1983 claim for deprivation of her right of freedom of association. 347
N.W.2d at 262. The plaintiff had made a sufficient showing that a genuine factual dispute
existed as to whether her husband's activities were a "substantial" or "motivating" factor
in her nonhiring by the school board. Id at 263; see Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). Lynne Cybyske's constitutional claim was sufficient to
defeat defendants' motion for summary judgment. The claim was therefore returned to
the trial court for further proceedings. 347 N.W.2d at 263.
The second issue addressed by the court was the plaintiff's claim of infringement on
the freedom of choice in marriage. Id. at 259. The court declined to address this constitu-
tional claim, stating that this area of constitutional law was "undeveloped." Id. at 263. In
reviewing the evidence, the court stated that the defendants' refusal to hire Lynne
Cybyske did not deny her the right to marry but it did "allegedly discriminate against her
because of her particular choice of marital partner." Id The court held that, to the extent
there might be a rights-in-marriage claim, it was already merged in the constitutional
freedom of association claim. Id
The third issue was the plaintiff's claim that the trial court's granting of the summary
judgment was premature because the plaintiff's discovery had not been completed. Id at
259. The court held that the claim was moot since the freedom of association claim sur-
vived the defendants' summary judgment motion, thus requiring further court proceed-
ings. Id at 263.
The final issue was the claim that the trial court erred in denying Lynne Cybyske's
motion to amend the complaint to add her husband as a party plaintiff. Id at 259. The
court found that the trial court had not exceeded its discretion in denying the motion and
that Cybyske did not have standing to assert her husband's claim. Id. at 264. The court
upheld the denial of the plaintiff's motion to amend. Id.
[Vol. I1I
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under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.12
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.13 The Act
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.14 Congress' objective was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities 15 and to remove the "artificial, arbitrary, and
12. Id The Minnesota Human Rights Act is contained in Chapter 363 of Minnesota
Statutes. The Act's declaration of policy states in part:
It is the public policy of this state to secure for persons in this state, freedom from
discrimination . . . [i]n employment because of. . . marital status . . . . Such
discrimination threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of this state
and menaces the institutions and foundations of democracy. . . . The opportu-
nity to obtain employment . . . without such [marital status] discrimination...
is hereby recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
MINN STAT. § 363.12(l)-(2) (1982). The Act "appears to be modeled after Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, et seq. " See Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395,
398 (Minn. 1978). The Minnesota Supreme Court has applied principles developed in
court decisions under Title VII for the purpose of construing the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. Id at 399; accord Zimdars v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 304 Minn. 288, 290,
230 N.W.2d 465, 466 (1975). For an informative discussion of the genesis of the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act, see Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota State Act
Against Discrimnation and the Uniform Law Commzssioners'Model Anti-Discrimination Act." A Com-
parative Analysis and Evaluation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 231 (1967). This article compares the
provisions of the model act with those of the state act. Id at 233.
13. Title VII-Equal Employment Opportunity, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253
(1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h(b) (1982). For a discussion of marital
discrimination prior to the enactment of Title VII, see Korvasky & Hauck, supra note 2, at
366-67 (examples of the pervasiveness of the no-spouse rule prior to Title VII).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (1982). A narrow exception to this broad ban exists.
Employers may discriminate on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin where the
criteria are "bona fide occupational qualification[s]." Id. § 2000e-(2)(e). The situations in
which employers may raise the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception
fall within the following categories: (1) "ability to perform (for example, physical ability
to perform, where jobs involve strenuous manual labor);" (2) "same sex (accomodating the
personal privacy of clients and customers, for example, conducting skin searches of prison-
ers);" and (3) "customer preference (the customer states a desire to work only with persons
in a particular classification)." The courts have taken an active role in defining BFOQ.
See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (being of the male sex not a BFOQ for
the job of correction counselor in maximum security prison); Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (being of the female
sex not a BFOQ for employment as a flight attendant); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (ability to perform).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted the Weeks standard which states that an
employer, in order to rely on a BFOQ exception for employment discrimination, must
present a factual basis to establish that all or substantially all persons not meeting the
qualification would be unable to safely and efficiently perform the duties of the job in-
volved. Lewis v. Remmele Eng'g Inc., 314 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1981); see also Lewis v.
Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 320 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1982).
15. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). In Griggs, the Court faced
the issue whether an employer was prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
from requiring a high school education as a condition of employment when (a) the stan-
dard was shown "not to be significantly related to successful job performance," (b) the
standard "operate[d] to disqualify . . . [blacks] at a substantially higher rate than white
applicants," and (c) the jobs had long been filled only by whites. Id. at 425-26. The Court
1985]
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unnecessary barriers to employment" which employers use to invidiously
discriminate. While the Title VII legislation specifically lists classifica-
tions upon the basis of which an employer may not discriminate,'
6 it
does not address marital status discrimination' 7 and no legislative history
on that issue exists.' 8 Consequently, without federal statutory guidance,
state courts have individually interpreted the term "marital status."9
Many states have addressed the definition issue and two prominent inter-
pretations have emerged. 2
0
ruled that if an employment practice which operates to exclude blacks cannot be shown to
be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited by Title VII. Id at 431.
16. Id. In Grgs, the Court indicated that once employment requirements were
shown to affect a protected class disproportionately, a defendant could escape liability by
proving the requirements were a "business necessity." Id. The precise meaning of "busi-
ness necessity" was not made clear. The Court simply stated that "[tihe touchstone is
business necessity" and defined a prohibited practice as one that "cannot be shown to be
related to job performance." Id The conventional interpretation of the business necessity
defense was established in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971),
cert. di mzrsed, 404 U.S. 1006 (197 1). See Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Dispa-
rate-Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 918-20 (1979) (discussing
Robinson). The rule in Robinson states in pertinent part:
[T]he applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for
adhering to a challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding
legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose must be suffi-
ciently compelling to override any racial impact.
444 F.2d at 798.
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
18. See Wexler, supra note 2, at 97 n.99.
19. Id at 126.
20. See id. at 126-32. The broad interpretation of marital status has been adopted by
state courts in four states: Washington, see in/ta notes 21-27 and accompanying text; Mon-
tana, see infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text; Minnesota, see in/ta notes 40-50 and
accompanying text; and Michigan. In Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 124 Mich. App. 780,
336 N.W.2d 215 (1983), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that a no-spouse rule vio-
lated the state's employment discrimination act on the basis of marital status. Id at 784,
336 N.W.2d at 217. The court ruled that the legislature's scheme designed to prevent
"discriminatory employment practices based on arbitrary classifications" would be "fur-
thered by construing the term 'marital status' to include a prohibition against discrimina-
tory employment practices based on the identity of one's spouse." Id
The narrow interpretation of marital status has been adopted by courts in three
states: New York, see infa notes 34-39 and accompanying text; New Jersey, and Hawaii.
In Thomson v. Sanborn's Motor Express, Inc., 154 N.J. Super. 555, 382 A.2d 53 (App.
Div. 1977), the court concluded that New Jersey's ban on marital status employment dis-
crimination merely prevented an employer from basing its employment decisions on
whether an individual was married or single. Id. at 557, 382 A.2d at 56. The court noted
that the company's "no-relatives" policy was not directed against married people and that
the plaintiff would not have been terminated had she been married to a nonemployee. Id
Thus, she had been discharged not because of her status as a married person, but because
of her relationship to a particular person-another employee. Id
In Moore v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1229 (D. Hawaii 1983)
(applying Hawaii law), the district court adopted the Thomson rationale in holding that
Honeywell's "no-relatives" policy was not based on the fact that a person is married, but
[Vol. I11
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The broad interpretation of marital status includes not only whether
one is married but also the identity or situation of one's spouse. The
Washington Supreme Court first adopted this liberal definition in Wash-
ington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Commission.2l In
Washington Water, an employer whose hiring practices included enforce-
ment of an anti-nepotism rule22 challenged the Commission's adoption
of a regulation prohibiting marital status discrimination. The regulation
provided that "discrimination against an employee or applicant for em-
ployment because of (a) what a person's marital status is; (b) who his or
her spouse is; or (c) what the spouse does," is an unfair practice because
the action was based on the person's marital status. 23 The Commission
adopted the anti-discrimination regulation after it determined that em-
ployers enforced anti-nepotism policies without considering the actual ef-
fect of the marital relationship upon the individual's merits, job
qualifications, or work performance.24 The employer argued that the
Commission overreached its authority by promulgating such a regula-
tion under the Washington State Human Rights statute.25
The Washington Supreme Court found the regulation valid and held
that the Commission had not exceeded its authority by adopting a regu-
lation that looked beyond the bare marital status of the employee to the
identity and occupation of his or her spouse. 26 The court's decision was
based exclusively on a legislative intent to prohibit all forms of employ-
ment discrimination.27
on the relationship between the parties, a relationship which may have been coinciden-
tally created by marriage. Id at 1231. The court held that the statute prohibiting marital
status discrimination was based only upon the existence or nonexistence of a spouse. See
21. 91 Wash. 2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149 (1979).
22. d at 64, 586 P.2d at 1151. Where a policy of anti-nepotism is adopted, the em-
ployer refuses to hire the spouse of an employee. When two employees marry each other,
one of the two individuals is terminated from employment. Id Where an anti-nepotism
policy is in effect, refusing to hire an applicant and discharging a spouse is done without
consideration of the actual effect of the marital relationship upon the individual's qualifi-
cations or work performance. d
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id at 69, 586 P.2d at 1154. The regulation was adopted pursuant to Washing-
ton's employment discrimination statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1) (Supp.
1983). The statute provides in pertinent part: "It is an unfair employment practice to
refuse to hire any person because of such person's age, sex, marital status, [or] race . ..
unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification." Id.
27. 91 Wash. 2d at 65, 586 P.2d at 1152, 1154. The court recognized "the fact that
the commission was given broad policy formulation and rulemaking powers indicates a
legislative recognition that all of the circumstances in which discrimination might exist
and all of the forms which it might take were not then known and could not be antici-
pated, and that the diligence and expertise of [the commission] was needed to achieve the
purpose intended in the statute." Id. at 1153.
The court noted the legislative finding that marital status discrimination "threatens
1985]
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The Montana Supreme Court also recently adopted a broad interpre-
tation of marital status.2 8 In Thompson v. Board of Trustees, School District
No. 12,29 the court held that marital status includes the identity and oc-
cupation of one's spouse. 30 The court stated that a broad interpretation
best effectuated the legislature's intent to both prohibit employment dis-
crimination and to encourage the hiring, promotion, and dismissal of
employees solely on the basis of individual merit. 3' In addition, the
court stated that the narrow interpretation of marital status 32 was "un-
reasonable" because of the potential absurd result that plaintiffs could
keep their jobs by divorcing, but lose their jobs by remaining married.
33
The New York Court of Appeals adopted the narrow interpretation of
marital status in Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights
Appeal Board34 The court concluded that the phrase denotes the particu-
lar relation an individual bears to the marital state rather than the iden-
tity or situation of one's particular marital partner.35 In Manhattan Pizza
Hut, the plaintiff was discharged under a rule that did not allow an em-
ployee to work under the supervision of a relative.36 The plaintiff alleged
not only the rights and proper privileges of [the state's] inhabitants but menaces the insti-
tutions and foundation of a free democratic state." Id. at 1152. The court also repeated
the legislature's finding that the right to be free from marital status discrimination was a
civil right and that a liberal construction of the statutory provisions was directed to
achieve the purpose of the statute. Id Cf Minnesota Human Rights Act, MINN. STAT.
§ 363.12(1)-(2) (1982) (declaration of policy containing similar findings).
28. See inha note 29. Marital status was not defined in the statute prohibiting em-
ployment discrimination based on marital status. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303
(1983).
29. 627 P.2d 1229 (Mont. 1981). The plaintiffs were former school administrators
who had lost their positions pursuant to a no-spouse rule adopted by the school board. Id
at 1230. The rule prohibited school administrators from having spouses employed in any
capacity in the school system. Id The board terminated one administrator and demoted
the other because both had wives who were tenured teachers. Id The plaintiffs alleged
that the school board's actions constituted marital status discrimination. Id.
30. Id at 1231.
31. Id The plaintiffs' suit was filed under the Montana Human Rights Act, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 49-2-303(1)(a) (1983), which specifically prohibits marital status discrimina-
tion. In addition, the plaintiffs filed under a statute that required employers to make
employment decisions on the basis of merit without regard to marital status. See 1d at
§ 49-3-201(1).
32. The narrow interpretation was defined by the district court as the "state of being
married, unmarried, divorced or widowed." 627 P.2d at 1230.
33. The district court construed marital status narrowly because the court found that
there was no "business necessity" exception under Montana law. Id at 1232. Therefore,
the court reasoned that the legislature must not have contemplated a broader meaning of
marital status which included a spouse's occupation. Id
34. 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980).
35. Id. at 512, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
36. Id. at 510, 415 N.E.2d at 952, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 963. The plaintiff had been em-
ployed for about four years under the supervision of her husband, the manager of a Pizza
Hut restaurant. Id at 510, 415 N.E.2d at 952, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
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that her dismissal violated New York's Human Rights Law. 37 The court
of appeals ruled that the term "marital status" referred only to the indi-
vidual's status-whether the person is "single, married, separated, di-
vorced or widowed"-and not to "who the spouse of the employee is or
what the spouse does." 38 The court's ruling was based on its interpreta-
tion of a legislative memorandum which indisputably emphasized the
individual's status and not that of any present or former spouse. 39
Until Cbyske, the leading marital status discrimination case in Minne-
sota was Kraft, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Human Rights. 40 In Kraft, the
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the broad interpretation of marital
status. 4 1 Four part-time employees who were married to full-time em-
ployees were denied full-time positions because of the defendant's anti-
nepotism hiring policy. The plaintiffs alleged that this policy, which pro-
hibited full-time employment of more than one family member at any
Kraft office, 42 constituted marital status discrimination under the Min-
nesota Human Rights Act.4 3
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the position that marital sta-
tus embraces the identity or situation of one's spouse as well as one's own
marital status.44 The court reasoned that a narrow interpretation of
marital status "would ignore the broad prohibition against arbitrary
37. Id New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301(15) (McKinney
1982), declares in part that it is unlawful discriminatory practice "for an employer or
licensing agency, because of age, race, creed, color, national origin, sex or disability or
marital status of any individual, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment." Id § 296(l)(a).
38. 51 N.Y.2d at 510-11, 415 N.E.2d at 952, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
39. Id at 512, 415 N.E.2d at 953, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 964. The court also noted that the
fundamental rule of construction of words of common usage would suggest that "marital
status" has the plain and ordinary meaning of the "social condition enjoyed by an individ-
ual by reason of his or her having participated or failed to participate in a marriage." Id.
40. 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979).
41. Id at 388.
42. Id at 387. Specifically, Krafl defined immediate family as "father, mother, hus-
band, wife, son, daughter, stepson or stepdaughter, brother, sister and in-laws" at a single
facility. Id
43. Id. at 387. MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1982) provides in relevant part:
Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is unfair em-
ployment practice:
(2) For an employer, because of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex,
marital status, status with regard to public assistance, disability, or age,
(a) to refuse to hire or to maintain a system of employment which unreasonably
excludes a person seeking employment; or
(c) to discriminate against a person with respect to his hire, tenure, compensa-
tion, terms, upgrading, conditions, facilities, or privileges of employment.
44. 284 N.W.2d at 388. For an argument that the court's interpretation was unwar-
ranted, see Note, The Mnnesota Supreme Court.- /979, 64 MINN. L. REv. 1183, 1184-85
(1980).
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classifications embodied in the Human Rights Act and would elevate
form over substance." 45 The court held that Kraft's anti-nepotism policy
was presumptively invalid and remanded the case for a factual determi-
nation of whether the policy was based on a bona fide occupational
qualification.
46
Under Kraft, the elements of a marital status discrimination determi-
nation are: (1) whether the individual is single, married, separated or
divorced; and (2) the identity or situation of the individual's spouse. 47
An employer must advance a compelling and overriding business neces-
sity to justify an employment policy that discriminates on the basis of
marital status.
48
In Cybyske, the Minnesota Supreme Court purported to adhere to a
broad interpretation of marital status. 49 The court held, however, that
employment discrimination based on the political status or particular
political posture of the plaintiff's spouse was not protected by the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act.50
In the spring of 1979, Lynne Cybyske's husband was elected to the
school board in the Burnsville School District. 5 1 Daniel Cybyske had
supported the teachers in a recent bitter teachers' strike and a pro-
teacher platform had been central to his campaign.52 As a school board
member, Daniel Cybyske was a "vocal, controversial advocate for a 'big-
ger voice' for teachers in school district decisionmaking."5
3
In the summer of 1979, the defendant school district hired Lynne
Cybyske as a long-term substitute teacher at Westview Elementary
School. 54 In September of that year, the Westview principal told Lynne
45. 284 N.W.2d at 388.
46. Id Kraft did not justify its policy at the hearing on remand. See Wexler, supra
note 2, at 127 n.239. For a discussion of bona fide occupational qualifications as they have
been interpreted by courts in the context of employment discrimination, see supra note 14.
47. 284 N.W.2d at 388. The Minnesota Supreme Court noted that their definition of
identity or situation was in accord with the elements and policy arguments adopted in
Washington Water. Id
48. Id. Business necessity is demonstrated by a showing that the discriminatory policy
is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business. Mere business convenience
is insufficient. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. State, 303 Minn. 178, 180, 229
N.W.2d 3, 10 (1975). For a discussion of business necessity under Title VII, see Comment,
supra note 16.
49. 347 N.W.2d at 259-60.
50. 347 N.W.2d at 261.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 259. The Burnsville School District is adjacent to Independent School Dis-
trict (I.S.D.) No. 196. Id
53. Appellant's Brief and Index at 5, Cybyske v. Independent School Dist. No. 196,
347 N.W.2d 256 (Minn. 1984). Daniel Cybyske had been elected with strong teacher
support in the Burnsville district. 347 N.W.2d at 259.
54. Id at 259. While a school member, Daniel Cybyske was paid by the Minnesota
Education Association to conduct two seminars for teachers on how to elect "pro-teacher"
candidates to school boards. Id
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Cybyske that he was "under a lot of pressure" from the school adminis-
tration because he had hired her. 55 As a result, the principal advised her
to keep a "low profile."
56
In June of 1980, Lynne Cybyske applied for a new fifth grade teaching
position with the school district. 57 The principal of Diamond Path Ele-
mentary School interviewed her and told her that she had the job but
that she must, as a matter of policy, have a final interview with the
school administration.58 Lynne Cybyske's subsequent rejection by the
administration was the only time the principal's recommendation in the
selection of a regular classroom teacher had been overruled.59
Lynne Cybyske set up a second interview with the school administra-
tion for August 12, 1980.60 On August 11, the school administration can-
celled the interview without explanation. It was not rescheduled.61 On
that same day, the district office requested names of additional candi-
dates to be interviewed for the fifth grade position.62 Lynne Cybyske
was nevertheless assured that she was the only candidate being given
serious consideration.
63
A week later, Lynne Cybyske was informed that another woman had
55. Id. at 258. Lynne Cybyske was hired to teach art and fifth grade. Appellant's
Brief and Appendix at 6.
56. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 6. Thomas Cosgrove, the principal, told
Lynne Cybyske that when appellee Dr. Lee Drogemueller, then superintendent of I.S.D.
No. 196, heard that she had been hired, he stated, "Lynne Cybyske; that guy's wife? Is
Tom crazy? What the hell was he thinking?" Id
57. Id "Thomas Cosgrove stated in his deposition that Dr. Lee Drogemueller .
had questioned Cosgrove's judgment in hiring [Lynne] Cybyske because of the possibilities
of Mr. Cybyske's involvement in the Board of Education interfering with Mrs. Cybyske's
teaching." Id at 22. Furthermore, Cosgrove admitted that "[t]he burden of proof of her
teaching abilities directly rested on [h]im and would be scrutinized by the superintendent
.. . [o]ver and above what would normally be true because of the position of Mr.
Cybyske on the school board." Id
58. Id at 7. Cybyske received good reviews from her principal while she was teaching
at Westview. Id.
59. Id at 7. Robert Ferguson, the principal, did in fact recommend Cybyske for the
fifth grade position. Id She also interviewed with Chester Gatchell, the teacher in charge
of the team of fifth grade teachers at Diamond Path. Id.
Normally at Diamond Path, an applicant's name and file are reviewed by the princi-
pal who calls the applicant for an interview. The applicant is then interviewed by the
principal and the lead team teacher. With input from the lead team teacher, the appli-
cant is recommended by the principal for hiring by the district. The district interviews the
applicant, and if they can agree upon an appropriate salary schedule, a contract is signed.
Id at 29-30.
60. Id
61. Id. at 7.
62. Id at 8. The personnel at Diamond Path Elementary School were surprised by
the cancellation and Ferguson assumed responsibility for rescheduling the interview. Id
63. Id
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been hired for the fifth grade position.64 The woman had only one-half
year's experience as a teacher, had never taught fifth grade, and had
never been interviewed by the fifth grade team teacher at Diamond
Path.65 The school administration had considered the woman for that
same position earlier that summer but rejected her in favor of Lynne
Cybyske.
66
On May 17, 1981, Daniel Cybyske received a telephone call from the
assistant superintendent of schools at Independent School District No.
196.67 The assistant superintendent told Daniel Cybyske that his wife
had not been hired because of Daniel Cybyske's views and remarks made
in his capacity as a Burnsville School Board member.68 Lynne Cybyske
subsequently filed suit against the school district and three of its
administrators. 69
Lynne Cybyske alleged that the school district violated the Minnesota
Human Rights Act by discriminating against her on the basis of her mar-
ital status. 70 She also alleged that the school district's actions infringed
upon her rights to freedom of association and freedom of choice in her
marital relationship.71
The trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judg-
ment. 72 The court found that the plaintiff's complaint "failed to allege
actionable marital status discrimination under either state or federal
law."73 The trial court also found that the plaintiff failed to state a cause
of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for deprivation of her constitu-
tional right of freedom of association. 74
A divided Minnesota Supreme Court 75 affirmed the trial court on the
main issue presented by the case, the plaintiff's marital status discrimina-
64. Id Cybyske was eventually scheduled for an interview on Saturday, August 16.
Id
65. Id.
66. Id at 8-9. Normal procedure for applicant review included an interview with the
team teacher. See supra note 59.
67. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 9.
68. Id This was one of several occasions in which Daniel Cybyske was criticized by
an official from I.S.D. No. 196 for his outspoken pro-teacher positions. John Hanson, one
of the assistant superintendents at I.S.D. No. 196, had earlier told Daniel Cybyske that he
should quit being a "teachers' mouthpiece." Id
69. 347 N.W.2d at 259.
70. Id Lynne Cybyske claimed that the reason she was not hired was because she was
married to Daniel Cybyske and that the school district did not like her husband's pro-
teacher views. Id
71. Id. at 259.
72. Id
73. Id.
74. Id
75. Justices Wahl and Yetka dissented only on the marital status ruling. Id. at 264-65
(Wahl, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see infra notes 84-91 and accompany-
ing text.
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tion claim. The court held that Lynne Cybyske did not have a cause of
action under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.76 The court, however,
reversed the trial court's finding on Lynne Cybyske's constitutional claim
and held that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment on
that issue.
77
The majority focused on whether retaliation against one spouse be-
cause of the political views or associations of the other spouse constitutes
marital status discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
78
The majority determined that the political status of one's spouse is not
protected under the Human Rights Act. 79 The court conceded the possi-
bility that the plaintiff did not get the job because she was married to
Daniel Cybyske. Nevertheless, the court determined that her argument
"prove[d] too much."o The court stated that the legislature did not in-
tend that any employer bias or predilection towards a spouse which is
imputed to the employee should subject the employer to an employment
discrimination suit.81
76. Id at 261.
77. Id at 259.
78. Id at 260. The majority stated that the specific question before them was
whether the Krafi "holding should be extended to prohibit discrimination against the
plaintiffjob applicant because of what her spouse was doing, namely, advocating 'disloyal'
pro-teacher views while a board member of another school district." Id
79. Id at 261. "The legislature did not intend to proscribe a particular political pos-
ture, whether of an employee or of the employee's spouse, in the Human Rights Act." Id
80. Id The majority claimed that the plaintiff sought to evade the finding in regard
to "political status" by "rephrasing the question." Id According to the court's analysis,
Cybyske claimed that she did not get the job "because she was married to Daniel Cybyske;
that the discrimination lies not in the unpopularity of her husband with the defendant
school district but in the fact that her husband's 'identity' or 'situation' is imputed to her.
Since this imputation is based solely on the marriage relationship itself, [the plaintiff ar-
gues that] there is marital status discrimination under the Act." Id
81. The court commented that: "Human nature being what it is, people have their
likes and dislikes. An employer may dislike an employee's spouse for a variety of reasons,
but it seems unlikely the legislature intended any kind of disliking to give rise always to a
discrimination lawsuit." Id. at 260-61 (footnote omitted). Although the court noted that it
could find no case which extended marital status discrimination to employees in a political
retaliation setting, the court cited an article which listed several areas where at least some
courts had indicated a willingness to find marital status discrimination by employees. Id
at 261 n.4, citing Alley, Marital Status Discrbniation: An Amorphous Prohibition, 54 FLA. B.J.
217 (1980). The areas include:
(1) a requirement that employees be either single or married; (2) enforcement of
no-spouse anti-nepotism rules; (3) the maintenance and enforcement of policies
of refusing to hire unwed mothers; (4) the maintenance and enforcement of poli-
cies refusing to hire women with dependents while hiring men with dependents;
(5) the maintenance and enforcement of policies requiring the employment of
married couples only; and (6) requiring female employees to change their last
name upon marriage.
Alley, supra, at 218 (footnotes omitted). Alley advocates the use of the narrow definition of
marital status and the continuation of no-spouse and anti-nepotism employment practices.
ld at 221.
1985]
13
et al.: Civil Rights—Employment Discrimination Based on Marital Status—Cy
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
In reconciling the Kraft holding, the Cybyske court noted that Kraft's
anti-nepotism rule was a "direct attack on the husband and wife as an
entity."82 In Cybyske, however, the court found that the school district's
actions were "not directed at the institution of marriage itself, at least not
with the same directness and closeness as in Kraft"
83
In the Cybyske dissent, two justices criticized the majority opinion for
significantly narrowing the broad construction given marital status in
Kraft.8 4 Justice Wahl, joined by Justice Yetka, maintained that the ma-
jority had misstated the legal question in the case.8 5 According to Justice
Wahl, the issue was not whether the political status of one's spouse was a
protected classification but instead, whether one could be denied em-
ployment under the Minnesota Human Rights Act because of the iden-
tity and situation of one's spouse.
86
Justice Wahl argued that the school district's failure to hire Lynne
Cybyske constituted employment discrimination on the basis of marital
status under the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 87 Justice Wahl also
noted that the Kraft court held that marital status embraces the identity
and situation of one's spouse,88 based upon its finding that "an employer
may differentiate on the basis of marital status only where a business
necessity is compelling and overriding."89
Finally, Justice Wahl argued that adhering to a broad interpretation
of marital status would encourage employers to consider job applicants
on the basis of individual merit,90 a rationale first espoused by the Wash-
ington and Montana Supreme Courts in adopting the broad construc-
tion of marital status.9 1
82. 347 N.W.2d at 261. Kraft's employment policy provided that a person would not
be hired where the applicant's spouse was already an employee. Id. Kraft's anti-nepotism
rule was, therefore, "contrary to the 'legislative judgment [that] reflects the protected sta-
tus the institution of marriage enjoys in our society.' " Id, clling Krafi, 284 N.W.2d at 388.
83. 347 N.W.2d at 261.
84. I at 264 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The dissent noted
the legislature's intent was to outlaw arbitrary classifications relating to marriage and to
allow marital status discrimination only where a business necessity is compelling and
overriding.
85. Id.
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id The identity was that of a pro-teacher school board member in a neighboring
school district. Id.
89. Id. The four part-time employee plaintiffs in Krafi were denied full-time employ-
ment not just because they were married but "precisely because of who their husbands
were, in that case, full-time employees of Kraft." Id
90. 347 N.W.2d at 265 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice
Wahl noted that employers would not be unnecessarily burdened by this broad construc-
tion. An employer could still discriminate against an applicant or employee if such dis-
crimination was based on a bona fide occupational qualification. Id.
91. For a discussion of the broad interpretation of marital status, see supra notes 21-33
and accompanying text.
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In determining whether marital status discrimination includes the
spouse's identity and situation, the majority avoided defining the term
"situation." Instead it rephrased the legal question to address only polit-
ical status.92 The court suggested that "situation" does not include the
political posture of a spouse but effectively declined to explicitly enumer-
ate what "situation" would include in other non-political contexts.93 Ac-
cordingly, the court will apparently uphold any employment
discrimination based on the political views or associations of the other
spouse,9 4 even where the spouse is only exercising his or her first amend-
ment rights. 95
The majority also failed to address the "identity" issue, 96 despite its
acknowledgement that the school district allegedly discriminated against
Lynne Cybyske "because of her particular choice of marital partner. '97
Lynne Cybyske's complaint specifically alleged that her marriage to
Daniel Cybyske caused the school district's alleged discrimination.98
Ironically, the Kraft holding was based on an analogous fact situation.99
The Kraft plaintiffs were denied employment not just because they were
married but precisely because of "who their husbands were." In that
case, their husbands were full-time employees of Kraft.10 0
The court could have justified the school district's alleged employment
discrimination if the district had advanced a compelling and overriding
business necessity to justify its rejection of Lynne Cybyske.oi The court,
however, found no indication in the record that Daniel Cybyske's activi-
ties on the school board would have any impact on his wife's effectiveness
as a teacher.102
In holding that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action for marital
92. 347 N.W.2d at 264 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The
Kraft court adopted the definition of identity and situation enumerated in Washington
Water. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. The Cyb)yske court, however, without any
explanation, stated that the Araft court had not defined these terms. 347 N.W.2d at 260.
This position provided the flexibility necessary for the court to reinterpret the legislative
intent so as to exclude discrimination based on political retaliation. Id at 260-61.
93. 347 N.W.2d at 261.
94. Id at 261 n.4. The court's statement of the legal issue and subsequent holding
would be consistent with this proposition. Id at 260.
95. Id at 262. The court acknowledged that where an employer discriminates against
a job applicant because the employer dislikes the activities of the applicant's spouse, par-
ticularly if that spouse is only exercising his or her first amendment rights, it would appear
that the job applicant's associational freedoms have been impaired. Id
96. Justice Wahl applied the Krafi rule to demonstrate the court's oversight. Id. at
264 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
97. 347 N.W.2d at 263.
98. Id at 258.
99. 284 N.W.2d at 387.
100. id
101. Discriminatory employment policies are allowed on the basis of a business neces-
sity. See supra note 48.
102. 347 N.W.2d at 263.
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status discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act,10 3 the
court has significantly reduced the flexibility previously available in a
test for discrimination.104 A plaintiff must bear the initial burden of es-
tablishing a prima facie case of discrimination.105 To prove discrimina-
tion one must show a distinction in treatment based on an impermissible
or irrelevant factor. ° 66 Lynne Cybyske need only have demonstrated
that her treatment was based on the political views of her spouse and
that the school district extended non-discriminatory treatment to other
teacher applicants. The court conceded that the school district discrimi-
nated on the basis of Lynne Cybyske's choice of spouse. 07 The court was
apparently persuaded that a "floodgates" situation would occur if they
upheld Lynne Cybyske's Human Rights Act complaint. 10 8 The court
flatly stated in dicta that the political status of one's spouse is not pro-
103. Id at 261.
104. The intent of the legislature in enacting the Minnesota Human Rights Act was
"to eliminate all discrimination in employment, however subtle." Kaster v. Independent
School Dist. No. 625, 284 N.W.2d 362, 365 (Minn. 1979). It follows that any test to deter-
mine whether a plaintiff has stated a prima facie case of discrimination must be flexible
enough to apply to a variety of employment contexts. Id.; accord Hubbard v. United Press
Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441-42 (Minn. 1983) (citing Kaster, 289 N.W.2d 362 (Minn.
1979)). Cybyske narrows this flexibility.
Justice Wahl argued that continued adherence to the broad construction of marital
status would be consistent with the court's previous holdings that "the remedial nature of
the Minnesota Human Rights Act requires a liberal construction of its terms." 347
N.W.2d at 264 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). As support for this
argument Justice Wahl cited City of Minneapolis v. Wilson, 310 N.W.2d 485 (Minn.
1981) (holding "race" discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of association
with persons of another race); Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn.
1980) (holding "sex" discrimination includes employer inaction in face of sexually deroga-
tory statements and verbal sexual advances directed at employee by fellow employees);
City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 86, 239 N.W.2d 197, 201 (1976) (term
"discriminate" as used in the Human Rights Act means distinction in treatment of indi-
viduals based on irrelevant or impermissible factors). Cybyske, 347 N.W.2d at 264-65
(Wahl, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
105. See Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Minn. 1978); Fisher Nut Co. v. Lewis,
320 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Minn. 1982); Minnesota Chem. Dependency Ass'n v. Minneapolis
Comm'n on Civil Rights, 310 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn. 1981). The plaintiff need only
show "the bare essentials of unequal treatment based on race, color, creed, national origin,
or sex." Dang, 263 N.W.2d at 399.
106. Richardson, 307 Minn. at 86, 239 N.W.2d at 201. The court stated that to establish
discrimination "it is often essential to show how similarly situated individuals who do not
possess the impermissible or irrelevant factor are treated." Id. at 86, 239 N.W.2d at 202.
For example, to establish discrimination in the arrest of a black person, one might under-
take to show that white persons whose behavior was substantially the same were not ar-
rested. Id
107. 347 N.W.2d at 263. The court stated that "the defendant's refusal to hire Lynne
Cybyske did not deny her the right to marry; it did, however, allegedly discriminate
against her because of her particular choice of marital partner." Id
108. Id. at 260-61.
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tected under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.109 The court's decision,
however, fails to provide any clear guidance as to the criteria used to
determine marital status discrimination based on the identity or situa-
tion of one's spouse.
Despite the court's purported adherence to the broad interpretation of
marital status," 10 the court relegated the identity or situation of a spouse
to the level of an important factor in determining whether marital status
discrimination exists.'" The impact of this factor on the court's future
determination of such discrimination will apparently be judged by the
degree of "directness and closeness" with which the discrimination is di-
rected at the institution of marriage. i 12 In essence, the test of marital
status discrimination in Minnesota places greater emphasis on "the pro-
tected status the institution of marriage enjoys in our society", 13 than on
the promotion of individual merit as a basis for employment. 14
The Minnesota Supreme Court moved aggressively in Kraft to provide
equality of opportunity in the work place by adopting the broad inter-
pretation of marital status." t5 The court's vague application of the
"identity or situation" elements in Cybyske dulls the very tools needed to
eliminate the underlying forces of discrimination which perpetuate eco-
nomic disparities. As our understanding of employment discrimination
and its impact unfolds, so too should our capacity to address those
problems. In Cybyske, no such gains were made.
109. See id. at 261.
110. Id The court stated that "[we] adhere to our broad construction of marital status
as enunciated in Kraft," i.e., in determining whether marital status discrimination exists, the
identity and situation of the spouse is an important factor." Id
11l. Id
112. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
113. Kraft, 284 N.W.2d at 388. The court in Kraft referred to the institution of mar-
riage as the preferred status when comparing the status of marriage with that of romanti-
cally involved individuals living together. Id
114. The Washington and Montana Supreme Courts emphasized that their decisions
to adopt the broad interpretation of marital status were based on the legislative intent to
encourage employment solely on the basis of individual merit. See supra notes 21-33 and
accompanying text.
115. 284 N.W.2d at 388.
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